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1. Introduction
Moore’s paradox, the infamous felt bizarreness of sincerely uttering construc-
tions like “I believe grass is green, but it ain’t”, has attracted attention since
its original discovery (Moore 1942).1 Moore-paradoxical utterances feel contra-
dictory, even though both conjuncts can obviously be true. It is often taken to
be a paradox of belief—in the sense that the locus of the inconsistency is the
beliefs of someone who so sincerely utters:
If you have an explanation of why a putative content could not
be coherently believed, you thereby have an explanation of why it
cannot be coherently asserted. (Shoemaker 1995, 227)2
This priority thesis, however, is insufficient to give a general explanation of
Moore-paradoxical phenomena (it’s also false) as:
I promise I’ll marry you, but I won’t
∗Thanks to Sarah Raskoff for the discussion which prompted this piece, Paul Benacerraf
and John Burgess for useful discussions on the topic of Moorean absurdity, members of the
New York Philosophy of Language Workshop for early feedback, and Derek Baker, Justin
Bledin, Eliot Michaelson, and Ken Turner for very useful comments.
1Philosophers have often distinguished the omissive form of Moore’s paradox—p, but I
don’t believe that p—and the commissive form—p, but I believe that not p. I deal primarily
with the omissive form here, but I don’t think there is much philosophical traction to be
gained out of the distinction once we reject the idea that we explain Moore’s paradox by
means of inconsistent or irrational belief. The commissive form more or less transforms into
the omissive by means of the presumption (not always true!) that quite generally people
believe not p only when they don’t believe p.
2Atlas (2007) has argued vigorously (and, I think, successfully) against Shoemaker’s ac-
count on grounds that Shoemaker illicitly moves from “manifesting a belief in P” to “man-
ifestly asserting my belief in P”. He also argues against the uniform paradoxicality of con-
structions of the form “F , but I don’t belief that F” by constructing cases in which they can
be sincerely asserted. I agree with the examples, but think that they can be handled by the
account I suggest at the close of this paper.
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has the same paradoxical character as:
I believe it’s raining, but it ain’t
even though the latter, but not the former, involves expression of the utterer
believing thus and so. Moore-paradoxical utterances can occur in non-assertoric
constructions and, moreover, can occur in the context of speech acts which do
not express mental states at all.3 I will leave aside, for the purpose of this es-
say, whether we should be giving an independent analysis of Moore’s paradox
for thought or, alternatively and as I prefer, whether we should regard Moore-
paradoxical thought as derivative from Moore-paradoxical speech.4 I will not
address the priority thesis again directly, but it should be clear to the reader
that the considerations below tell directly against it.5
The fact that there are Moore-paradoxical constructions which do not in-
volve expressing mental states supports the hypothesis that Moore paradoxi-
cality arises due to speech acts engendering commitments of a particular sort.
Some speech acts, like typical assertions, give rise to commitments to believing
thus and so.6 Others, such as promises, give rise to commitments to acting
thus and so. When we go on to immediately deny that these commitments
are met, our purpose in engaging in the speech act becomes mysterious and
interpreters quite reasonably become puzzled about what we were attempting
to accomplish by means of our utterances. We have seemingly undermined the
purpose of making the promise or assertion at all. Basic linguistic competence,
presumed of those we typically interpret, requires mastery of the commitments
incurred by asserting, commanding, and promising, and the like.7 Given this,
explicit claimed violation of these commitments gives rise to our inability to
successfully interpret the speaker. This is the basic sense of “inconsistency” or
“oddness” that we now call Moore paradoxicality.8 Or, anyways, so I will argue.
I originally argued for a version of this claim in a paper rejecting expressivism
(Woods 2014). It struck me then, as it strikes me now, as the right sort of take
on a general phenomenon which had been typically addressed in only its belief-
involving manifestations. I was happy to find afterwards that (Atlas 2007)
3See (Williams 2013) for independent arguments against the priority thesis. Williams
focuses on the failure of the priority thesis when we restrict our attention to the case of belief.
My interest is in showing that even if the priority thesis holds for belief, it doesn’t suffice to
explain other cases of Moore paradoxicality.
4See (Baker and Woods 2015, §IV.B) for suggestions in this direction.
5For good examples of linguistically acceptable utterances plausibly manifesting irrational-
ity, like “I shouldn’t do it, but I will anyway”, see the discussion in (Baker 2014, §6).
6Take ‘typical’ here to be meant seriously; I do not mean to deny that there are contexts
where a more relaxed standard for asserting is in force. After all, we’ve all shot the shit a
time or two.
7This, of course, is a familiar view. For loci classici, see (Searle 1969) and (Brandom 1994).
For a more recent discussion treating of related issues that arise with lying, see (Michaelson
2016) and (Stainton 2016).
8I mean ‘inconsistency’ here in the older and broader sense of “standing in tension with
one another”, not the narrower “unable to both be true”.
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provided further and distinct reasons useful to establishing what I originally
took the most natural explanation of Moore paradoxicality. Atlas writes:
. . . it is bizarre to think that the impossibility of the rational, sincere
assertion of a Moore sentence could explain the oddity of uttering
a Moore sentence assertively (as Moore (1993: 207) would put it),
even if the impossibility of a sincere, “rational” assertion explains
why either the utterance is insincere, or expresses a “non-rational”
belief or a corrigible belief, or is not an assertion—oddities all, but
none of insincerity, non-rationality, corrigibility, and an assertoric
speech-act “misfire” is the oddity of uttering the Moore sentence
assertively. None of those consequences would seem to explain the
particular oddity of uttering the Moore sentence assertively. (As
Paul Benacerraf once remarked, in reaction to this claim, an ade-
quate account of the oddity must appeal to principles that every
speaker/hearer can be expected to “know”, in the sense in which
we know our language and its uses. Not every speaker, surely, is
natively a Port Royal logician.) (Atlas 2007: 142-143)
and I completely agree. These sorts of explanation do not get at the root of
the problem. Insincere assertions—“I’m pleased to see you, but I ain’t”, when
I ain’t—still give rise to Moore paradoxicality, as do irrational and corrigible
assertions. The madman who yells that the sky is constantly falling in, but
then immediately demurs is not just mad, but linguistically incompetent. And
failures to assert at all tend to undermine the phenomena in question since there
is a natural and immediate explanation of why the failed assertors have failed
to “contradict” themselves in the relevant sense—they have not actually made
an assertion. What we need is a way to chisel down to the class of utterances
where Moore paradoxicality arises and, then, to give an actual explanation of
why, in many cases, these utterances give rise to such a feeling of oddness.
Since insincere promises, commands, and so on can still commit, commit-
ment violation by itself is insufficient to explain Moore paradoxicality. What we
need is a general account of why we get Moore paradoxicality in some cases—one
which explains why these cases are puzzling for everyone, linguistically savvy or
not. We also need to explain why it is so easy to multiply Moore-paradoxical
cases for a variety of different speech acts. We can articulate these demands in
terms of two desiderata of an explanation of Moore paradoxicality:
Uniformity: An explanation of Moore paradoxicality must explain
its occurrence in all cases, not merely the somewhat special, if his-
torically important, case of first-personal assertions.
Egalitarianism: An explanation of Moore paradoxicality must ex-
plain its manifestation to all linguistically competent interpreters of
speech (when interpreting speakers themselves presumed linguisti-
cally competent.)
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Since the irrational and the insincere typically count as linguistically competent,
it isn’t sufficient explanation of a Moore paradoxical utterance that the utterer
is seen as irrational or insincere as a result of the seeming inconsistency or ir-
rationality of their utterance. In what follows, I’ll first argue for the breadth of
Moore-paradoxical phenomena. I will then argue that this breadth makes im-
plausible Shoemaker’s attempt to derive Moore paradoxicality from the “logic”
of belief. Similar views will fall for similar reasons, though I do not argue for this
explicitly. I will then turn to developing the commitment-theoretic explanation
of Moore’s paradox I favor.
The key to my explanation involves welding a general theory of the commit-
ments arising from speech acts to a constraint on normal interpretation of the
utterances of others. The constraint, roughly, is that utterers should generally
be taken to reflexively intend to take on the commitments incurred by means
of the speech act they are engaged in. In particular, this means that when a
speaker says “grass is green, but I don’t believe it is”, they reflexively intend
to take on the commitments of asserting that grass is green. Since these com-
mitments involve believing what I assert, when I deny this commitment in the
second conjunct, I undercut my presumed intention to take on this commitment
and thereby puzzled the speaker. I seem, in the most literal sense, inconsistent.
Likewise, when I say “I promise to give you 5 Turkish lira, but I won’t”, I am
presumed to reflexively intend to take on the commitments of promising which
include giving you 5 Turkish lira. Only presumed, of course, since I might actu-
ally be insincere. So, when I claim that I won’t fulfill this commitment, I give
rise in my interpreter the puzzling feeling of directly undermining my earlier
promise.
This account allows me to meet the constraint that flagrantly insincere as-
sertions, promises, and what have you can be felicitously uttered—as they ob-
viously can be. Irrationality is no excuse for failing to meet a promise, in many
cases, and it certainly is no excuse for not believing what you assert. What is
needed for cases with the form of Moore’s paradox to be linguistically felicitous
is that the default presumption of reflexive intention be waived in that context. I
will discuss such cases below (see §2.2, §5). I conclude that the resulting account
satisfies uniformity, egalitarianism, and doesn’t over-predict occurrences of
Moore’s paradox. What more could we want from an explanation?
2. Much Moore Paradoxicality
Sincerely uttering any of the following in non-deviant contexts gives rise to the
feeling we call Moore paradoxicality:
(1a) It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is.
(1b) Get me a beer, but I don’t want you to get me a beer.9
9See Condoravdi and Lauer (2012), §2.2 for defense of the incoherence of this example and
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(1c) Boo Yankees! I have no negative feelings towards the Yankees.10
(1d) Would that I could have another drink, but I don’t wish for another.
(1e) I promise I’ll pick you up at the airport, but I won’t.
(1f) I swear to you that he’s a spy, but he isn’t.
(1g) It might be raining, but it’s not.
None of these except the first involve belief in a direct fashion. (1b) involves
denying the possession of a desire, (1c) involves denying possessing certain eval-
uative attitudes, (1d) involves denying that I wish in certain ways, (1e) involves
denying that I’ll act in certain ways, (1f) involves denying that a certain fact
holds, and (1g) the same.
Note, as evidence of the Moore paradoxicality of these constructions, that
switching to the past tense (where it makes sense) results in sensible construc-
tions:
(2a) It was raining, but I didn’t believe it was.
(2d) Would that I could have had another drink, but I didn’t wish for another.
(2e) I promised I’d pick you up at the airport, but I won’t.
(2f) I swore to you that he’s a spy, but he wasn’t.
(2g) It might have been raining, but it wasn’t.11
The coherence and lack of paradoxical character of the past-tense versions of
present-tense oddness is one of the characteristic marks of Moore paradoxicality.
The examples above are also non-paradoxical when we put them into the second
or third-person (where such a modification is natural).
Are these examples really Moore paradoxical? Yes, it seems so. Searle and
Vanderveken (1985) argue that any speech act conjoined with the denial of its
sincerity condition will, in typical circumstances, produce the usual reaction we
label as Moore paradoxicality. Consider, for example:
What time is it? But I don’t want to know what time it is. (Williams 2015)
Searle and Vanderveken do not discuss cases like (1f), but they feel entirely anal-
ogous to me and, I hope, to you. Sincerity conditions are a usual and flagrant
case in which we get Moore paradoxical phenomena, but it is entirely unclear
discussion of both it and examples like (1d).
10See Woods (2014) for discussion of this example.
11(1b) and (1c) do not have natural past tense constructions.
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why they should be the only such cases.12 The above, especially the promissory
cases, seem clearly instances of the phenomenon that Moore described.13
If these examples really are Moore paradoxical—and I put it to you that they
are—then we need an account of the phenomenon they are all instances of.14
That is, satisfying uniformity demands that our account of Moore paradox-
icality encompass assertions, imperatives, ejaculations, optatives, promissory
utterances, avowals, and epistemic modals. Moreover, such an account should
predict Moore paradoxicality in cases where it occurs, but should not predict
Moore paradoxicality in cases where it does not or, importantly, assimilate or-
dinary cases of having inconsistent beliefs to the same phenomena.
extensional adequacy: An explanation of Moore paradoxicality
should not overspill to cases of ordinary inconsistent or irrational
beliefs.
Can we make sense of uniformity if we explain typical cases of Moore-
paradoxical utterances on the basis of inconsistent beliefs? In order to do so,
we would have to derive inconsistent beliefs from beliefs expressed by the above
constructions. Consider, for example, (1f). Why is it that we get Moore para-
doxicality from swearing to a fact, then immediately denying that the fact holds.
The potential explanation, on the inconsistent belief approach, holds that when
we swear that p, we express a belief that p and when we deny p, we express
our belief that not p. Presuming that believing that not p rationally entails—
requires, on pain of irrationality—not believing p, we get that we do not believe
p (at least if we are rational). But believing p and not believing p are inconsis-
tent, so we have displayed that we believe in a way which can’t be satisfied. And
this, presumably, accounts for the feeling of contradiction. This explanation also
vindicates the first-personal present-tense character of Moore’s paradox. I can
coherently say of you that you swore up and down that grass is purple, but it
ain’t. I can even coherently say of me that I swore up and down that there was
no meat in the dish, but there was.
12For an entertaining non-standard case, consider Sorensen’s ‘God knows that we are not
theists’ (Sorensen 1988: 17). On the presumption that sincere utterance of this commits me
to the existence of God, this looks like a similar case. On the other hand, it threatens to
collapse a potentially useful distinction between pragmatic paradox and Moore’s. So I shall
not further pursue this type of case here.
13I shall not here argue further that these cases are really Moore paradoxical. My account
works even if they’re not—though its motivations become slightly less clear. (Heal 1977) is
often cited as claiming that (1b) and like constructions are not Moore paradoxical, but I read
her as less concerned with Moore paradoxicality in general and more concerned with whether
wanting is a sincerity condition on commanding. It’s worth noting that my solution below
(§4) neatly handles her examples as all of them are cases where the presumption of a reflexive
intention on the part of the utterer is not in force.
14I am willing to hedge here and say that for those of us, like myself, Searle and Vanderveken,
etc. who find Moore’s paradox in cases outside of first-personal assertions, another account is
needed. Of course, I think the data I canvassed above is sufficient to establish that Moore’s
paradox is a more general phenomenon, but that is a fight I cannot have here.
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There is a certain unloveliness to this type of explanation. It is not at all
clear that in swearing to something or promising to do something we express
the sort of beliefs necessary to generate Moore paradoxicality. Even putting this
problem to the side, we also need very contentious principles of rational belief
in order to carry out this type of explanation.
2.1 Problem 1: Contentious Principles of Belief
Consider, for example, that not only (1f), but also:
(1f*) I swear to you that he’s a spy, but I don’t believe it.
display Moore paradoxical character. Our explanation has to somehow handle
both. If we explain (1f) by appeal to the fact that swearing that p expresses
my belief that p, then presumably we should claim that denying that we believe
that p expresses our belief that we do not believe p. Presuming that believing
that we do not believe that p rationally entails not believing p, we likewise ob-
tain an inconsistency in our beliefs.
We have now invoked a fair number of contentious principles of belief in
running our explanation. We need principles of rational belief like:
• B(¬p)⇒r ¬B(p)
• B(¬B(p))⇒r ¬B(p)
• ⇒r ¬(B(p) ∧ ¬B(p))
in order to generate the relevant contradiction. But these are not obvious on
their face: suppose, for instance, I believed q and thereby came to be required
to believe not p on pain of irrationality. Does it follow, on pain of irrationality,
that I need to refrain from believing p? Not obviously, especially if I am un-
aware of the fact that I’m rationally committed to believing not p.
These principles are more plausible when taken to govern obvious rational
requirements for explicit belief, but even there they are not obvious. Is it obvious
that if I’m required to believe that I believe p that I am thereby obviously
required to believe p? No; suppose I’m trying to recover my beliefs after a
terrible accident. You, a reliable guide to my previous beliefs, testify that I did
not believe p, but you chuckle as you say it. I ask why and you mention that
even though I didn’t believe p, I believed that I believed p and that I defended
both stances vehemently. Presumably, if I think I had good reason and I trust
you, it’s plausible that I am rationally required (given the evidence) to believe
that I believe p and, additionally, to not believe p—though here only on the
presumed existence of evidence for this stance.15 It would be far better to have
15This case was suggested to me by thinking over the example of amnesiac Gray Davis in
(Atlas 2007: 131)
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an account of the problem which does not presume contentious principles of
rational belief like the above.
2.2 Problem 2: Irrationality and Moore’s Paradox
A more pressing worry, which I articulated in my earlier work, is that irrational-
ity isn’t sufficient to offset Moore-paradoxical reactions (Woods 2014, objection
3). The utterer of a Moore-paradoxical utterance displays linguistic incompe-
tence, not outright irrationality. We should distinguish these reactions accord-
ingly. Compare, for example, the person who asserts one of:
• I want a cookie, they’re in the jar, but there’s no reason to go to the jar
• Istva´n is more likely a libertarian librarian than a librarian
• Either Saniye or Sam went to the bank, Sam went if Saniye did, but Sam
didn’t go
They are explicitly displaying one or another form of irrationality, but it is hard
to accuse them of linguistic incompetence. Rather, on the presumption that
they mean the same by their words that we would, they fail to be fully rational.
Or, alternatively, consider a direct case. Suppose I’m a known lunatic, likely
to spurt this or that nonsense at any turn. Does that make my utterance of:
I’m made of sugar
or my utterance of
Fictional characters can’t exist, yet here I am16
incoherent? I submit the answer is no. They are just resoundingly and obviously
false. On the other hand, even if I am a known incoherent, my utterance of:
I believe that I myself am made of sugar, but I’m not
is resoundingly bizarre and feels self-contradictory.17 Why is this? Clearly, it
has nothing to do with displaying the fact that I’m incoherent or irrational.
Rather, it has to do with some feature of these cases over and above the display
of irrationality.
It should not be surprising that we can find cases of exhibited irrational-
ity that are not Moore paradoxical. Explicit contradictions can be felicitiously
uttered, but presuming the connection of belief and assertion, such an utter-
ance will commit the utterer to possessing inconsistent and thereby irrational
beliefs.18 Atlas is sensitive to this point:
16This example is plausibly an example of a structural irrationality, unlike the preceding,
which is plausibly an example of substantive irrationality.
17I here adopt Atlas’s trick of putting in an explicit reflexive pronoun so as to force the
right reading. See (Atlas 2007: 136-137).
18I don’t think all inconsistent beliefs are irrational, but even some manifestly irrational
inconsistencies can be felicitiously uttered.
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A difficulty with Langford’s explanation is that there are a denu-
merable number of self-contradictory statements that are perfectly
felicitous, so that the logical inconsistency of the total signification
of a statement cannot be sufficient for its assertoric oddness. (Atlas
2007: 142)
and we should be as well. Moore’s paradox is interesting and worth investigat-
ing exactly because it is not simply a case of some fancy type of inconsistency
or irrationality in our beliefs or the content of what we assert.
It is also possible to cook up potential cases in the opposite direction; it is not
obviously irrational, though it is obviously Moore paradoxical, to assert that the
theory of evolution is correct, but that I don’t believe it (at least in the recherche´
sense of irrationality involving asserting against the total balance of evidence.)
After all, I might have evidence for believing that the theory of evolution is
false, but be unwilling to bring this evidence to bear on what I am willing to
assert. If these considerations are right, and if irrationality simply doesn’t imply
linguistic incompetence, then we need an account of Moore paradoxicality that
doesn’t reduce it to exhibition of irrationality. That is, we need an account that
respects Egalitarianism.
2.3 The Alternative
Even if we could finesse the above problems with rationality and principles of
rational belief, we would face another. uniformity already makes plausible the
idea that we should look elsewhere than inconsistent beliefs for an explanation
of Moore paradoxicality. To see why, consider (1e). Why is it Moore paradoxical
to promise while denying that I’ll meet that promise? One explanation claims
that when we promise, we express a belief that we will fulfill that promise and
when we deny we’ll meet that promise, we express a belief that we won’t. How-
ever, even if promising to give you money, then denying I believe that I will
gives rise to Moore paradoxicality, the case seems very different than promising
to give you money, then explicitly denying that I will. And, since promising
to give you money, then denying I intend to fulfill that promise likewise seems
Moore paradoxical, we need to invoke the contentious claim that intentions (or
lack thereof) require us to believe that we will (or won’t) satisfy them. That is,
if we tried to explain the Moore paradoxicality of the last case on the inconsis-
tency of belief model.
Similar pressure can be found in reconsidering cases of manifest displays of
irrationality which nevertheless do not manifest the sense of linguistic incompe-
tence characteristic of Moore’s paradox. Moran (2001: 84) suggests that we find
such cases on the therapist’s couch, where through a combination of external
evidence and behavioral observation, a subject realizes that they really do be-
lieve such and so, but also affirm that they do not, reporting from “the inside”,
so to speak. “My mother didn’t mistreat me, but I believe she did”, in such
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a context, is a display of a manifest psychological irrationality, but one which
does not trigger the sort of feeling of linguistic incompetence we see in the above
examples. So there seems to be a mismatch between manifesting psychological
irrationality and the jarring phenomenon that Moore described.19
The cases here pile up. We can make some kind of coherent sense of boo-
ing a sports team, then later denying that I really believe that they’re terrible,
whereas booing a sports team and then denying I dislike or disfavor them seems
Moore paradoxical. Consider also that I can explicitly exhibit that I fail to meet
a commitment by my actions without any direct commitment to believing that
I’m failing to meet it. Suppose, for example, I promise to return your favorite
shirt to you while simultaneously intentionally and explicitly setting it on fire. I
haven’t asserted that I believed that I won’t satisfy my promise, though I have
definitely displayed my lack of intention to do so. Even if we can manage to
stuff these constructions under the general belief-oriented account, we do so by
giving indirect explanations of their Moore-paradoxical character that neglect
the character of the particular speech act involved. A better account which
respected this difference is preferable.
An alternative view is available: we need merely take speech acts, like swear-
ing and promising, to generate commitments in some way and view overt decla-
ration that we will or do violate these commitments as underlying the linguistic
oddness of Moore’s paradox. Take our example from above of swearing to the
truth of p. This speech act generates a commitment to the truth of p. We could
call such a commitment a guarantee. When we deny that we meet it, we cause
confusion in the interpreter and thereby the feeling of contradiction. There is
no contradiction, of course, just inconsistency between what we have committed
to and what we have said is the case. How, that is, could I guarantee the truth
of something I am willing to assert is false? This style of explanation promises
to vindicate both uniformity and egalitarianism. We might worry, though,
that it generates too much Moore paradoxicality and violates extensional
adequacy.
19Thanks to Derek Baker for helpful discussion. Moran nevertheless suggests that there is
a problem with the pragmatic picture of Moore’s paradox since “...the prevalent diagnosis of
Moore’s Paradox as the paradigm of a “pragmatic paradox” is inadequate at best, for the
puzzling quality persists outside the context of utterance and speech act.” (70). However,
his examples of this persistence involve internally tokening the Moore paradoxical thought.
This, of course, is an action that may very well bring along commitments all of its own,
whether basic or derivative from commitments involved in ordinary utterance or assertion
of the corresponding sentence (Baker and Woods, 2015, §4 explores a similar strategy to
distinguish Moore-paradoxical incoherence from semantic incoherence). Since I have put aside
Moore’s paradox for thought above (and since the pragmatic diagnosis is hardly prevalent), I
won’t pursue this point further here.
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2.4 Too Much Moore Paradoxicality?
Adopting some version of this account, we will find Moore paradoxicality all
over the place.20 Consider, for example, the speech act of promising. A typical
promise plausibly commits me to (a) keeping the promise, (b) intending to keep
the promise, and (c) believing that I can keep the promise. Correspondingly,
we should expect that:
(3e) I promise to pick you up, but I won’t.
(4e) I promise to pick you up, but I don’t intend to pick you up.
(5e) I promise to pick you up, but I don’t think I can.
feel Moore paradoxical. Which, I submit, they do. Of course, they all feel
slightly different in terms of strength and the conditions under which we can
felicitously utter each differ, but this is as we should expect. Commitments
come in different strengths. This is, in fact, a virtue of the account; it explains
in a natural way why:
(1a) It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is.
feels more Moore paradoxical than:
(6a) It’s raining, but I don’t have reason to believe that.
and:
(7a) It’s raining, but the evidence (on balance) suggests otherwise.
is not Moore paradoxical at all. We are plausibly committed to having some
reason for asserting what we believe, we are strongly committed to believing
what we assert, but we are not at all committed to asserting in line with the
balance of evidence. Put a slightly different way, sincerely asserting either of
(1a) or (6a) is evidence of linguistic incompetence, whereas sincerely asserting
(7a) is merely evidence of epistemic incompetence. The explanation for this is
that in (7a) we do not overtly deny in the right conjunct commitments incurred
by the left conjunct. Whereas, in (1a) and (6a), we do.
Of course, there may be more cases of overspill. Consider a case in which I
promise to do something that everyone knows that I cannot. Or, alternatively,
a case in which I promise to do something, the promising of which entails (in
light of other background commitments), that I cannot keep it. Are these cases
of Moore’s paradox? Presumably not; a reasonable account of Moore’s paradox
should explain this fact. Below, after I discuss in significantly more detail the
20Although, as I argued in (Woods 2014), we do not find it where the expressivist predicts
we should. See (Toppinen 2014, 2015) and (Woods 2015) for discussion and (Raskoff ms) for
further worries. Baker (2014, 2015) argues that we also do not find it where guise-of-the-good
theorists predict we should.
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notion of commitment, I will turn to such cases and show that the addition of
a constraint of normal interpretation—that the speaker reflexively intends their
utterance to be taken in a certain way—rules out these sorts of cases and allows
a more plausible commitment-theoretic account of Moore’s paradox.
3. Commitments
The explanation I want to offer makes crucial use of the notion of commit-
ment.21 What are these commitments though? The rough outline of the story
I want to tell claims that commitments are the product of a system of formal
norms governing our speech behavior. Commitments are not to be reduced to
the mental state of feeling committed or some form of intention; rather, they
are social facts about what we ought to do given what we have done. I take
on a commitment by performing certain actions—those actions the system of
norms marks as conditions for being committed. For example, when I promise,
I commit myself to satisfying that promise, whether or not I intend to do so
or feel like I must. Likewise, when I swear to the truth of something, I am
criticizable if it is false, whether or not I believed that it was true when I so
swore: I take on a commitment to that thing being true. We may perform these
actions knowing full well that in doing so, I take on a commitment. We may
perform these actions without knowing any such thing. Sometimes ignorance
of the law is no defense, while sometimes ignorance of the law is a full defense;
likewise with social facts.
Where, though, do these commitments come from? Drawing on my recent
work (Woods 2016, forthcoming), I take commitments to be the product of im-
plicit social rules, much like I take legal, moral, and promissory norms to be the
product of implicit social rules. These social rules give rise to notions of blame
and criticizability which underwrite, in many cases, normative judgments of
people who violate them. They also give rise to constitutive rules for analyzing
and interpreting the speech of others, analogous to how the social rules govern-
ing a game of chess or bar pool give rise to constitutive rules for interpreting
the outcome of a game of chess or bar pool. Importantly, in voluntarily taking
on a commitment, I bind myself to attempting to satisfy it, at least typically,
and can be fairly interpreted as taking that commitment as a constraint on my
action. Of course, I can be committed in ways which don’t guide my action and
not all commitments are explicitly recognized, but the (interpreted as) volun-
tary undertaking of a commitment will be important here and below. When I
21This focus on commitments isn’t entirely novel to me. Commitments have been used
for analyzing illocutionary acts by Searle (1969), Brandom (1983), Wright (1992), Alston
(2000), MacFarlane (2005), Harnish (2005), and others. The focus on using them to explain
Moore-paradoxical behavior is relatively novel, being invoked explicitly only by Baldwin (2007)
to my knowledge. Baldwin, though, focuses on our undertaking a commitment—note the
psychological character here—to the truth of what we judge. My analysis is less mentally-
oriented and broader, as I countenance commitments to lots of things besides the truth of
what we judge or assert.
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am under a commitment, it will typically be explained by both the system of
social rules giving rise to norms and the performance of the action which put
me under the commitment.22
We will start by looking at one of the more common ways of proceeding here,
the notion of a sincerity condition, and show that it is inapt as a full analysis of
the relevant notion of commitment. I will then turn to a more general picture
on which sincerity conditions form a special subclass of the commitments of
particular speech acts. It turns out that even commitments are insufficient to
generate Moore paradoxicality since we can incur commitments by means of
speech acts where we are explicitly incapable of meeting the commitment. I
then turn to adapting a proposal of Bach and Harnish (1979) to assuage this
problem.
3.1 Sincerity Conditions
Consider the paradigm case of a speech-act engendered commitment—the con-
nection of assertion with belief. When we make an assertion, absent special
conditions, those who hear us presume us sincere. This means, in particular,
that they take us to believe what we assert. If I say “this paper is late”, then
unless I’ve given some signal that I’m not to be taken seriously—an upraised
eyebrow, a bizarre intonation contour, etc—I am presumed to believe that this
paper is late. If I do not believe this, and this comes out, then I am criticizable
for not speaking sincerely.23 If I don’t believe this paper is late, and it doesn’t
come out that I don’t, I am nevertheless fairly interpreted as believing this pa-
per is late.
This connection between belief and assertion is often called a sincerity con-
dition. That is, we take it that what it is to sincerely assert that my paper is
late constitutively involves me believing that my paper is late. Sincerity con-
ditions apply to speech acts other than assertions. Plausibly, it is insincere for
me to promise that I will give you 5 Turkish lira if I have no intention of doing
so and it is likewise insincere for me to request that you get me a beer if I
have no desire that you do so.24 Many theorists have taken the expression of a
sincerity condition to be fundamental to the explanation of Moore-paradoxical
phenomena.
22Some commitments, of course, are standing and don’t require any action other than par-
ticipation in a particular social context in order to be in force. See (Woods 2016, forthcoming)
for more detail, especially of how to get reasons to act out of commitments.
23Strictly speaking, I am criticism-liable, not yet criticism-worthy. It may be that criticism
is misplaced, depending on the conditions under which I failed to believe what I asserted.
Nevertheless, someone is licensed to criticize me (even if it would be a moral error for them
to do so) merely by the fact that I have violated a norm of correct assertion. Compare the
legal notions of being prosecution liable and prosecution worthy.
24See Condoravdi and Lauer (2012), §2.2 for defense of this claim and that the resulting
request is typically incoherent.
13
...when one performs the speech act one necessarily expresses the
sincerity condition and thus to conjoin the performance of the speech
act with the denial of the sincerity condition would be to express and
deny the presence of one and the same psychological state. (Searle
and Vanderveken 1985: 19)
However, contra these theorists, this does not mean that we fail to commit
ourselves in some way when we explicitly insincerely promise or request. Ac-
cording to many promissory conventions, if I promise you to pay 5 Turkish lira,
as I pull out my empty pockets, I have still promised. And, likewise, if I request
you get me a beer, while telling my friend that I really don’t want you to do it,
I have still requested it. If I am in an appropriate position of authority, I can
still hold you responsible for failing to heed my request when you don’t, even if
I never wanted you to satisfy it in the first place. For some plausible constraints
on commanding, requesting, promising, and the like, insincerity is no excuse.
The case of assertion and sincerity is not entirely representative of the class
of commitments incurred by a particular illocutionary act. This is because we
capture nearly all of the commitment of assertion when we talk in terms of sin-
cerity conditions. Since the purpose of assertion is to convey information about
what I believe (about the world) and, typically, to get you to believe it as well,
when I am insincere, I typically contravene the usual purpose of my asserting in
the first place.25 The close connection between sincerity and commitment also
holds for some other illocutionary acts, like that of apologizing. An insincere
apology is no apology at all since, presumably, the purpose of an apology is to
make manifest my feelings of regret. No feelings of regret, no apology. But it
is not true for some other common illocutionary acts, like promising, swearing,
requesting, demanding and such like. My demand may be insincere, but that
doesn’t make it fail as a demand—it just makes me a bit of a jerk. And some
illocutionary acts do not have sincerity conditions at all—there is no particular
mental state required to back up naming one’s new cottage Dunroamin.26
So sincerity conditions are inadequate as a full analysis of the relevant notion
of commitment. What we need is a more general picture of commitment on
which the commitments of illocutionary acts can spill past what is required for
an illocution to be sincere.
25Note that this is not to say that we can explain what an assertion is merely in terms
of this purpose. That is a further step I am not here endorsing. See (MacFarlane 2011) for
discussion. See also (Lackey 2007) for useful examples where we can successfully assert while
explicitly violating the sincerity condition. This is relevant to §4 below.
26Or, anyways, no mental state other than the general knowledge of what I am doing. This,
of course, is required for nearly all actions, illocutionary or otherwise, for which we can be
held responsible.
14
3.2 Commitments in General
Sincerity conditions give rise to a particular class of the commitments. Plausi-
bly, they play the role of constitutive rules specifying what it is to sincerely φ,
for φ a particular speech act we can engage in (Searle 1969). A sincere promise
is one we intend to keep. A sincere assertion is one we believe. A sincere decla-
ration of intention is one where we so-intend. And so on. Not all commitments
are connected to sincerity, however. An insincere promise is still a promise, as
any 12 year old knows. Likewise an insincere assertion counts as an assertion,
as any politician skewered on the Daily Show knows all too well. Sincerity is
nice, but it isn’t everything.
Why do sincerity conditions give rise to commitments at all? Why sincerely
promise? Because there are more than constitutive rules in play in a particular
conventional enterprise like the practice of promising. There are also regulative
rules governing the various practices in play (Searle 1969). Regulative rules,
like drive on the right, pay your parking tickets, or don’t wear white shoes before
Easter, govern existing behavior, (formally) obliging us to act thus and so, at
least to those practices we engage in. The reason that sincerity conditions give
rise to commitments is that the practices under consideration are governed by
the regulative rule: be sincere!. Since we have a (formal) obligation to be sincere
when we assert, we have an obligation to believe what we assert.
The reason for the parenthetical ‘(formal)’ in the above is that there is often
taken to be a distinction between merely formal obligations, like the obligation
to be polite, and obligation tout court, like the obligation to never stab someone
just for fun. Merely formal obligations are those which we have to the degree to
which we care to engage in a particular conventional activity like that of polite
behavior.27 Thankfully, we can bypass this murky dispute in the cases under
consideration by noting that the ability to opt out of merely formal obligations
is typically muted in cases of illocutionary acts. I can choose not to assert and
not to promise, but I cannot simply opt out of the obligations associated with
asserting and promising by choosing not to care about them. It’s just not that
sort of game.
This means that the sanctions which are associated with violating my obli-
gations in the cases of asserting and promising cannot be demurred by saying
that I don’t care. I’m an involuntary participant in these conventions merely
by my participation in the acts of promising and asserting. This is similar to
the cases of games in general. I can choose not to play bar pool, but insofar as
I play bar pool, I am obliged by the rules tacked on the bar wall. The fact that
I don’t care about these rules does not excuse me from whatever sanctions are
tied to violation of them (typically loss of the game and general disapprobation
27I am speaking here in the voice of the many; I personally believe that etiquette and
like “merely formal obligations” are often given undeserved short shrift. See (Woods 2016,
forthcoming).
15
of my fellow players. And, at least in Boston, getting my name rubbed off the
chalkboard.)
3.3 Commitments and Explaining Moore-Paradoxical Utterances
Sincerity conditions are insufficient for explaining Moore paradoxicality since
cases like swearing to the truth of something, commissives like promising, declar-
atives like “you’re fired” and the like can engender Moore paradoxicality without
violating sincerity conditions. The conditions required for the successful carry-
ing out of a swearing, a promising, and a declaration have to do with the relevant
authority to carry out such an action and not with the possession of a particular
mental state. As I’ve said a number of times now, an insincere promise is still a
promise and declaring we won’t fulfill it is different from declaring that we don’t
intend to fulfill it. Yet both are Moore paradoxical. Put bluntly, the point is
that the sincerity condition of a promise is the possession of an intention, not
a performance. Yet we cannot adjoin a declaration of non-performance to a
promise without Moore paradoxicality, regardless of what mental state we hap-
pen to be in.
If sincerity conditions won’t suffice, perhaps the general category of com-
mitments will do. Unfortunately, we here face a problem with extensional
adequacy. There are cases in which we explicitly and overtly violate our com-
mitments but where no Moore paradoxicality occurs. Consider, for example, a
case in which I promise to give you the original deed to my house. I am ab-
sentmindedly lighting a cigarette and do so off of a scrap of paper in my pocket
I light off of a campfire. You, hearing my promise, watch as I simultaneously
light my cigarette off of the original deed to my house.
Have I committed myself to giving you the original deed to my house? Yes.
Have I displayed, overtly and explicitly, my failure to fulfill this commitment?
Yes. Has my assertion given rise to a case of Moore’s paradox? No. Compare
a case far closer to a Moore-paradoxical utterance. We’re talking about the
deed to my house and it is right there in front of us. I simultaneously set it
on fire and promise to give it to you. In such a case, it seems that I have also
explicitly failed to fulfill the commitment I’m making, but in such a way as to
actually give rise to the Moore-paradoxical feeling. After all, I’m putting right
in your face that I am knowingly destroying my ability to fulfill my commitment.
If these behavioral cases don’t resonate, we can get a similar effect by means
of case of perjury or insincerity. Suppose I—a prominent mafioso—swear to
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I then swear that
I did not murder Tip on the night of July 17th. Immediately released from
my oath, I mutter “of course I did, but what do you expect me to say?” Or,
alternatively, suppose in the course of a relationship my partner and I are de-
bating about whether we will always care for each other. I, knowing myself,
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say that I’m almost certain to have lost interest in 5 or 6 years. My partner,
desperate for reassurance, begs me to promise him it won’t happen. I finally
cave and say: “Okay, okay. I promise to love you forever...of course, you and
I both know that won’t happen.” In such a case, it seems clear to me that I
have still committed myself to loving him forever; it’s just that I will not do so.28
Recapping briefly, we have discussed both a general notion of commitment
and the special case of commitments which arise from sincerity conditions. We
then saw that the commitments arising from sincerity conditions do not suffice
as an explanation since (a) some cases do not involve sincerity conditions at
all, and (b) we can evince our lack of sincerity without giving rise to Moore
paradoxicality. Broadening our commitments resolves (a), but it does little
to resolve (b) since we can still find cases of Moore paradoxicality even when
we have explicitly violated our commitments. Something else is needed for
commitments to explain our target phenomenon.
4 Commitment-Theory Done Right
If commitment and explicit demurral thereof is insufficient to explain Moore’s
paradox, then what needs to be added? We find the answer to this in a common
thought about illocutionary actions, articulated nicely in principle form by Bach
and Harnish:
Communicative Presumption The mutual belief in the linguistic
community CL to the effect that whenever a member S says some-
thing to another member H, S is doing so with some recognizable
illocutionary intent. (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 60-61)
Bach and Harnish take this presumption, held at least implicitly by all compe-
tent speakers and interpreters, to govern successful interpretation of the speech
acts of others. Their focus is on communicative acts and, in particular, on
the expression of sincerity conditions in carrying out these communicative acts.
They take expression of a sincerity condition to be governed by the scheme:
For S to express an attitude is for S to R-intend the hearer to take
S’s utterance as reason to think S has that attitude. (Bach and
Harnish, 1979: 15)
and to R-intend (reflexively intend) something is to intend that the inten-
tion to do it be recognized (typically by the interpreter.) Putting these to-
gether, when someone says something with recognizable illocutionary—here
expressive—intent, we take them to intend that our recognition of their inten-
tion gives us reasons to believe that they believe what they say; we are thereby
generally entitled to attribute to them belief in what they have asserted.
28The reader is invited to guess at how this example would actually play out in practice.
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This picture is geared towards a communicative picture of illocutionary acts.
Given our focus on cases where the illocutionary act, such as a promise, gives rise
to a commitment to act, not merely to intend to act, we need to look elsewhere
than expression to explain how to get Moore’s paradox out of commitments.
(See also §3.1 above.) Luckily, we don’t have to look far. Expression is one thing
that we can do with illocutionary intent. Another is to take on commitments
incurred by participating in an illocutionary practice. We can lay this down by
means of a schema, as above:
For S to commit themselves by means of an utterance is for S to
R-intend the hearer to take S’s utterance as reason to think S is
voluntarily engaging in the practice and thereby taking on the com-
mitments engendered thereby.
Putting this together with Communicative Presupposition, we obtain that
when someone says something with recognizable illocutionary intent, we take
them to intend that our recognition of their intention gives us reasons to think S
is voluntarily engaging in that practice; we are thereby generally entitled to treat
them as recognizing that they are thus and so committed and acting accordingly.
If we tie this into the above discussion of commitments, we can see that
treating an utterer as recognizing that they are thus and so committed entitles
us to treat them as being bound and acting in accords with their commitments.
At least those that are immediately recognizable. We take those who recognize
their commitments to also intend to satisfy those commitments any linguisti-
cally competent φ-er, where φ is a speech act like asserting, will immediately
recognize.29 When they go on to explicitly deny that they will meet these
commitments, by denying they’ll satisfy their commitments, we obtain the sort
of self-undermining that characterizes Moore paradoxicality. If they recognize
that their voluntary engagement with this practice commits them and requires
taking these commitments as guiding their action, why would they deny that
they’ll satisfy these commitments?
Let’s work though a particular case. Suppose you promise to give me 5 Turk-
ish lira, but then immediately deny that you will do so. By Communicative
Presumption, I take your utterance to be knowably intended to be a promise.
I also take promising to be a way of committing yourself to keeping the content
of the promise. Since you are committing yourself, I take you to intend me to
recognize your intention to subject yourself to the commitment to keep your
promise. But, given that I recognize this and recognize that you want me to
recognize it, I am completely puzzled as to why you would immediately go on
to disabuse me of my recognition of your intention to submit yourself to the
29This hedge is necessary to explain why far-out violations of commitments can be coherently
tacked onto something like a promise. I might just not recognize that I cannot both have
lunch with you and pick up Bob at Atatu¨rk airport within 5 hours. Further discussion of this
obviously and easily solvable problem would distract, not illuminate.
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commitment to keep your promise. Crash.
Of course, this does not mean that someone cannot insincerely engage in
a practice or, after so engaging, lose their interest or ability to satisfy their
intention to keep their commitments. Of course they can. This explains why
the third-personal, past-tense, and otherwise non-first-personal cases of Moore’s
paradox aren’t paradoxical. There are lots of reasons for taking someone to no
longer intend to satisfy their commitments. What’s important here is that the
first-personal acts involving committing oneself, like the first-personal acts in-
volving expressing, gives rise to a presumption that we then intend to keep our
commitments. Frustration of this presumption causes the paradoxical feeling.
When this presumption is not in force, such as when there is a contextual reason
to interpret our illocutionary action non-standardly, as in the cases described
in the last section, then we do not have any paradoxical feeling. This is exactly
the right result.30
Essentially, this theory ties together a commitment-theoretic picture of (some)
illocutionary acts31 with a Bach/Harnishian account of how to interpret speech-
acts. This allows us to retain the idea that many illocutionary acts commit us
to things other than the possession of mental states, but to also explain why, in
typical occurrences of illocutionary acts, we are permitted to attribute to the ut-
terer a particular sort of intention: an intention for us to recognize their intention
to subjugate themselves to the norms of the (conventions governing) particular
illocutionary acts they have engaged in. This view has the advantages of both
the commitment view—it is sufficiently divorced from the theory of verbal com-
munication so as to allow the cases of behavioral Moore’s paradox like the one
above involving flagrantly lighting the deed to house on fire—while retaining
the advantageous non-mysteriousness of the Bach/Harnish communicative pre-
supposition account. It allows us to satisfy uniformity as the picture captures
all cases of Moore paradoxicality, egalitarianism since the main assumption
is that competent speakers and interpreters presume illocutionary intent, and
has at least the potential to satisfy extensional adequacy as we can explain
why not all commitments incurred by speech acts give rise to Moore’s paradox.
4.1 External Conventions, Attributed Intentions
One worry with the above account is that it presumes that speakers commit
themselves by actually intending to carry out their illocutionary act. This may
strike some—it strikes me as possibly—psychologically unrealistic. It also seems
to neglect the fact that we engage in speech acts without thinking through what
30We can resolve other problems for utterances with Moore-paradoxical form, like those in
(Atlas 2007), by noting that context can suggest that we interpret reflexive pronouns, like ‘I’,
in non-standard ways in special contexts like those of an amnesiac going over “their” past
with a therapist.
31Compare with the commitment-theoretic picture of assertions discussed in (MacFarlane
2011).
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we are accomplishing by means of them. We all know on reflection that by car-
rying out various illocutionary acts we commit ourselves thus and so. However,
it is nowise clear that this is clear to us, explicitly, at the time that we are
actually carrying them out.
If this worries you, I will note that I am torn between the above account of
commitment and more externalist alternatives on which:
For S to commit themselves by means of an utterance is for S to be
fairly attributed the R-intention for the hearer to take S’s utterance
as reason to think S is voluntarily engaging in the practice and
thereby taking on the commitments engendered thereby.
or the combination of the even more externalist schema:
For S to commit themselves by means of an utterance is for S’s
utterance to subsume them under a norm governing that type of
utterance.
and the principle:
Whenever a member S says U to another member H, absent special
conditions, S should be interpreted as R-intentionally committing
themselves by means of U .
Any of these views would give a recipe for satisfying uniformity, egalitar-
ianism, and potentially extensional adequacy. Which is actually correct is
a matter for another time and another paper. Note also that I have spent fairly
little time talking about what norms actually govern various illocutionary acts.
In the case of assertion, this has been extensively discussed (see (Weiner 2007)
for a useful overview) and in the general case of speech acts, a reader can find
useful accounts in both (Searle and Vanderveken 1985) and (Bach and Harnish
1979). Again, little turns on this for my point, so long as my above assumptions
about particular speech acts and their commitments are close enough. All I
need is that some speech acts commit us to things other than possessing vari-
ous mental states in order to motivate my general picture; which things we are
actually committed to is mostly besides the point for this.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that in order to accommodate the wide variety of Moore para-
doxical phenomena, we need to abandon the idea that we can explain Moore
paradoxicality in speech by means of Moore paradoxicality in belief. I went
on to argue that we could not use irrationality in speech or insincerity to run
this sort of explanation; rather, we need to move to a commitment-theoretic
account of Moore paradoxicality. I then sketched the details of this view, argu-
ing that we needed a presumption about the intentions of speakers (adopted, in
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modified form, from Bach and Harnish) to separate the commitments incurred
by speech acts which gave rise to Moore paradoxical reactions and those which
did not. The resulting picture vindicates uniformity, egalitarianism, and
potentially vindicates extensional adequacy. (subject to a suitable filling
in of the gaps.)
I will close on a final advantage of this kind of view. I suggested above (and
in my (2014)) that the known irrational can still make promises, declarations,
and assertions in ways that give rise to Moore paradoxicality. Suppose we make
the presumption, suggested above, that when someone typically says something
to someone else, they are doing so with illocutionary intent. If we presume
this for ordinary folk, presumably we should also presume it of the irrational as
well unless we know that their irrationality is manifesting in lack of ability to
successfully communicate. After all, irrationality is not an all or nothing affair
and even the raving mad can sometimes successfully request a glass of water.
If we presume this sort of interpretive charity in assessing others, then it seems
that we should sometimes be startled when even someone known to be irra-
tional deliberately undercuts themselves in requesting, then denying that they
want something. We can back-solve to see that they weren’t really voluntarily
engaging in an illocutionary act (or, alternatively, deliberately flouting their
commitments), of course. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever successfully
argued that Moore-paradoxical utterances can’t be later explained. It is their
current bizarreness that is so remarkable.
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